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Can auditors be independent? –  
Experimental evidence 
 
Summary 
In the U.S., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act made the audit committee responsible for the appointment, 
compensation and oversight of the auditor. We examine whether this institutional change resolves 
the alleged problem of an unconscious favoring of the management (Bazerman et al. 1997, 2002, 
2006). In our experimental design, we make use of the particular features of the German 
institutional setting as it enables us to manipulate the client of the auditor in a realistic and clear-
cut way. First, we find that auditors demonstrate professional scepticism in the evaluation of 
evidence while they issue unbiased audit opinions. Second, we confirm that perceiving financial 
incentives to be high may bias the audit opinion. Making the auditor accountable to a supervisory 
board proved helpful in reducing this risk. Third, we show that auditors who perceive the 
psychological incentives to be high tend to favor the judgment of the management. This effect 
disappears for experienced auditors.  
 
 
JEL: C90, K22, M42 
 
Keywords: Accountability; Audit Committee; Auditor Independence; Client 
Retention Incentives; Experience; Professional Skepticism 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 transformed the U.S. institutional audit environment. 
One key change was that an independent audit committee is now responsible for the appointment, 
compensation and oversight of the auditor (Section 301). Historically, the management has 
nominated the auditor and negotiated audit fees (SEC 2003b). One of the goals of this change 
was to weaken the accountability of the auditor towards the management board in order to 
improve auditor independence. First, the auditor’s economic incentive to please the management 
should be reduced by granting the audit committee the authority to hire the auditor. Second, the 
audit committee should also “insulate the auditor from the pressures that may be exerted by 
management” (SEC 2003b). Nevertheless, Bazerman et al. (2006) and Moore et al. (2006) 
maintain that the problem would not been resolved and that auditor independence is still − as a 
matter of fact not as a matter of law − impossible due to psychological factors (Bazerman et al. 
1997; Bazerman et al. 2002). They argue that the auditor would still feel accountable towards the 
management board and would implicitly seek its approval. This would not only have the effect of 
tempting the auditor to willingly misreport (DeAngelo 1981), but, more importantly, 
unconsciously bias the judgment and decision making of the auditor towards the management. 
Meanwhile, Nelson (2006) believes that the change in the responsibility of auditors’ appointment 
would belie the impossibility of auditor independence. 
We make use of the German institutional setting to set up an experiment to generally test 
for the effects of placing the responsibility of appointing auditors with an independent board. 
Specifically, we test whether the strengthening of the accountability relationship between the 
auditor and the independent boards can improve auditor independence by reducing economic 
incentives and the psychological pressure to follow the preferences of the management of the 
audited company. The German institutional setting is especially suitable for an experiment 
addressing this research question as its particular features allows for a clearer cut and a more 
realistic experiment compared to experiments using the U.S. institutional setting. It is more clear-
cut as the management and supervisory board are more distinctly institutionally separated in the 
German two-tier system compared to the U.S. one-tier system. Even more important, it gives us 
the chance to manipulate the client of the auditor in a realistic way as there are a large number of 
companies in Germany that are economically similar but differ with respect to the responsibility 
of auditor’s assignment. There are about 20 000 companies that are required to be audited and 
that can choose whether to form a supervisory board or not. If they decide to do so, the 
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supervisory board is responsible for the appointment of the auditor; if they decide not to do so, 
the management board is responsible for it. In contrast, in the U.S., the independent audit 
committee is now responsible for the appointment of the auditor for all companies with a 
statutory audit with only very few exceptions.  
We choose an experimental design for several reasons. First, this research method is 
appropriate for answering our research question as it allows for randomly manipulating relevant 
independent variables. It is also well-suited to test for effects of experience and to disentangle 
whether observed effects are mainly driven by economic incentives or psychological reasons. 
Second, an empirical study on those companies, which are comparable in economic terms and 
only differ with respect to the group responsible for auditors’ appointment, would be difficult to 
conduct due to a lack of data as these companies are medium-sized and non-listed. Furthermore, 
it might suffer from a self-selection bias as these companies are free to choose whether to create a 
supervisory board or not. 
In our experiment, we manipulate the client of the auditor (management board, 
supervisory board) between subjects in a randomized manner. We measure both the perceived 
economic incentives and the perceived psychological pressure for each auditor. To test for the 
effects of experience, we ensured that auditors from all hierarchical levels participated: The 
number of assistants, managers, senior managers and partners in our sample is reasonably 
balanced. Overall, 72 auditors from two of the Big 4 audit firms participated. They were given 
the task to evaluate the accounting method used by the audited company in the preliminary 
statement for two ambiguous accounting cases. We follow Turner (2001) and distinguish between 
belief and action tasks. First, auditors had to perform belief tasks by evaluating the meaning of 
different pieces of audit evidence and by judging the degree of conformance of the preliminary 
financial statement with GAAP. Second, they had to perform action tasks by choosing the 
appropriate measurement value for the respective balance sheet item and by deciding which type 
of audit opinion to issue. We classify the two later tasks as action tasks as they directly affect the 
financial statement, while the two former tasks do not.  
Our results are as follows. First, we find no general impairment of auditor independence 
when auditors are accountable towards the management board. In fact, we even find that, to the 
contrary, auditors are more skeptical in belief tasks when they are accountable towards a 
management board with incentives to manipulate earnings. We find no effect of client on action 
tasks. This suggests that professional skepticism is effective in counteracting potential 
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accountability effects. It seems that the suggestion by Moore et al. (2006) to improve auditor 
independence by making the auditor “preemptively self-critical” (p. 18) is already existent .  
Second, we find that auditors who perceive economic incentives to be high and who are 
accountable towards the management tend to favor the position of the management in their audit 
opinion. This result holds for both inexperienced as well as experienced auditors. This danger of 
an impairment of auditor independence can be neutralized by making the auditor accountable 
towards a supervisory board.  
Third, we find that auditors consider the accounting method used by the management to 
be more appropriate when they perceive the psychological pressure to be high. This effect can be 
observed both for auditors who are accountable towards the management and for auditors who 
are accountable towards a supervisory board. It seems that the supervisory board is not able to 
insulate the auditor from psychological pressure exerted by the management. However, 
experience seems to help to cope with psychological pressure. 
We contribute to auditing research by testing for the effects of making an independent 
board responsible for the appointment of the auditor by manipulating auditor’s client. Earlier 
research in auditing has generally assumed that the management board is the client of the auditor 
and has mainly concentrated on examining factors accentuating or alleviating the effects of client 
pressure. Factors examined are, for example, litigation risk, business opportunities, fee pressure, 
client credibility, or goal commitment (e.g. Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; Haynes et al. 1998; 
Gramling 1999; Jenkins and Haynes 2003; Kadous et al. 2003). Furthermore, we address the 
suggestion of Bonner (2007, Chapter 4.6) to disentangle the effects of economic incentives and 
psychological pressure on auditor judgment. We do so by measuring separately auditors’ 
perception of both factors.  
In the next section, we describe the U.S. audit setting with a focus on the recent changes 
in auditors’ appointment and show how it compares with the German setting. In section 3, we 
develop our hypotheses by drawing from the accountability theory of Tetlock (1983) and from 
earlier auditing research. Section 4 explains the experimental procedure and provides descriptive 
statistics. The results are reported in section 5, before the paper is concluded with section 6. 
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THE AUDIT APPOINTMENT 
Recent Changes in the Role of the Audit Committee in the Audit Appointment in the U.S. 
Prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the board of directors was responsible for the 
appointment of the auditor and for negotiating auditor compensation (Abdel-Khalik 2002). The 
consequence of this arrangement was that the auditor was, in effect, hired and compensated by 
the management of the audited company (SEC 2003b). In such a situation, one might agree with 
the statement that "it strains imagination to see the auditor as independent of the management" 
(Abdel-Khalik 2002, p. 100). Bazerman et al. (1997) even claim that independence is impossible 
for auditors who consider the management as their client (see also Bazerman et al. 2002; 
Bazerman et al. 2006; Moore et al. 2006).  
These claims are very worrisome, given that “it is of utmost importance to the profession 
that the general public maintain confidence in the independence of independent auditors” 
(AICPA AU Section 202.03). Furthermore, auditors are mandated by law to "maintain total 
independence from the client at all times". They have a "public watchdog" function, and are 
obliged to "complete fidelity to the public trust" (United States v. Arthur Young & Co. et al., 465 
U.S. 805 (1984)). The Securities Act of 1933 (Items 25 and 26 of Schedule A) and the Security 
Exchange Act of 1934 (Item 13 (a) (2)) also require the auditor to be independent. Specific 
independence requirements like the prohibition of certain nonaudit services (SEC 2003a) are 
stated in Item 10a of the Security Exchange Act of 1934. The PCAOB (2005) has promulgated 
ethics and independence rules, as has the AICPA in SAS No. 1 and in the Code of Conduct 
(AICPA 2006).  
The SEC addressed the potentially problematic relationship between the auditor and the 
audited company already in 1972, when it recommended to public companies to form 
independent audit committees (SEC 1972). This recommendation was later on complemented by 
disclosure requirements (SEC 1974, 1978). In 1978, the NYSE required from listed companies to 
have an audit committee that is responsible for the assignment of the auditor (Vicknair et al. 
1993). However, the effectiveness of these requirements and recommendations was dubious, as 
the audit committees were often not independent (Mace 1986). A number of initiatives tried to 
improve this situation, e.g. the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) and the National Association of 
Corporate Directors (2000). The SEC (1999) addressed the situation by tightening disclosure 
requirements for audit committees. 
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With the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the situation changed in three ways: First, the 
independence requirements for members of the audit committee were made more demanding 
(Section 301 SOX, SEC 2003b). Second, the audit committee was granted the responsibility for 
the appointment, compensation, and oversight of auditor’s work (Section 301 SOX, SEC 2003b)). 
Third, the requirements were specified regarding auditor’s communication with the audit 
committee (Section 204 SOX, SEC 2003a). These changes have the cumulative effect of making 
the audit committee the client of the auditor (Vera-Munoz 2005).1  
  
The Role of the Supervisory Board in Germany 
In Germany, a two-tier board structure is in existence for stock corporations 
(Aktiengesellschaften) and for private limited corporations with more than 500 employees2 
(Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung). This means that the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) 
and the management board (Vorstand/Geschäftsführung) are two distinct bodies of the 
corporation, in which the former has the legal duty to control the later (Sect. 111 German Stock 
Corporation Act). Thus, the tasks of supervision and management are clearly separated by law 
(Leuz and Wüstemann 2004). 
In Germany, the auditor has traditionally worked with the supervisory board on a basis of 
confidentiality and trust (Wüstemann 2004). With the passage of the Corporate Control and 
Transparency Act of 1998, the accountability relationship between the auditor and supervisory 
board was further developed (Ashbaugh-Skaife and Gassen 2006). The supervisory board was 
made responsible for nominating the auditor for election at the annual shareholder meeting, 
appointing the auditor, and negotiating the compensation terms (Sect. 111 German Stock 
Corporation Act, Sect. 318 German Commercial Act). The auditors, meanwhile, have extensive 
reporting duties towards the supervisory board. They must explain their audit findings in a 
confidential comprehensive auditors' report (Sect. 321 German Commercial Act) and have to be 
present at the supervisory meeting where the annual financial statement is discussed (Sect. 111 
German Stock Corporation Act). Furthermore, they are bound to report urgent findings to the 
                                                 
1 For those companies that do not have an audit committee, the board of directors is considered to be the audit 
committee. In this case, all members of the audit committee also have to fulfill the independence requirements 
(Section 205 SOX). 
2 Section 1 Paragraph 3 Gesetz über die Drittelbeteiligung der Arbeitnehmer im Aufsichtsrat, Drittbeteiligungsgesetz) 
(One-Third Codetermination Act) 
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supervisory board, e.g. the immediate risk of insolvency or the discovery of fraud (Section 321 
German Commercial Code). These changes foreshowed the changes in the U.S. 
Most important for our experimental design, there are a large number of companies in 
Germany that are comparable in economic terms, but differ with respect to the body responsible 
for the appointment of the auditor. This scenario arises from two features: First, the number of 
corporations that are required by law to be audited is much larger in Germany than in the U.S., 
since all corporations that are at least of medium size must be audited without a restriction to 
companies with publicly issued securities (Section 316 German Commercial Code). Corporations 
are generally considered to be of medium size when they have more than 50 employees.3 Second, 
private limited companies with less than 500 employees are not required to have a supervisory 
board, but can decide to have one voluntarily.4 In case that they decide to have one, the 
supervisory board is responsible for the appointment of the auditor; otherwise this responsibility 
is with the management board (Section 318 German Commercial Code). Therefore, private 
limited companies with more than 50, but less than 500 employees have a statutory auditor that 
has either been appointed by the supervisory board or by the management board. A large number 
of about 20 000 corporations fall into this category as the private limited company is the 
dominant form of incorporation in Germany.5  
 
                                                 
3 Section 267 German Commercial Code specifies the requirements. A corporation is of medium size when two of 
the following three requirements are fulfilled in two consecutive financial years: 1) more than 50 employees, 2) a 
balance sheet total of more than 4 015 000 Euro, 3) sales of above 8 030 000 Euro. 
4 Section 52 Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung, GmbHG (Private Limited Liability 
Company Act). 
5 This number is based on information provided by the German statistical office (Statistisches Bundesamt 
Deutschland): On December 31, 2006, there were over 27 700 corporations with 50 to 250 employees. Subtracting 
the total number of operating stock corporations (7000) provides a conservative estimate of at least 20 000 private 
limited companies with 50 to 500 employees. 
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Main Effect of Client 
Auditors are accountable to various groups, e.g. management, audit committee, team 
members, superordinates, reviewers, investors, regulators, and the general public (Gibbins and 
Newton 1994; Emby and Gibbins 1988). In our experiment, we are interested in the effect that 
being accountable towards a client with known views has on auditors’ judgment and decision 
making. In such an accountability relationship, people tend to employ an acceptability heuristic 
which can lead to an attitude shift (Tetlock et al. 1989; Lerner and Tetlock 1999). This means that 
people unconsciously gravitate toward the preference of the other party and adopt a "socially 
acceptable" compliant position (Tetlock 1983; for auditing see e.g. Gibbins and Newton 1994; 
Messier Jr and Quilliam 1992; Blay 2005). The rationale behind this phenomenon is that "the 
simplest way of coping with accountability is by making decisions that one is reasonably 
confident will be acceptable to others" (Tetlock 1985, p. 311) 
Antecedents for the use of the acceptability heuristic and the resultant attitude shift are (1) 
feeling an accountability pressure, (2) having the objective of gaining the approval of the other 
party, and (3) the need to achieve that objective in a way which minimizes cognitive efforts 
(Tetlock 1985). The appearance of an attitude shift is also bounded by a reasonableness constraint: 
The attitude of the accountable person shifts towards the other’s preference only as long as this 
preference is justifiable to some degree (Kunda 1990; Boiney et al. 1997). Connected with the 
acceptability heuristic is the theory of motivated reasoning. The focus of this theory is the 
predecisional judgment process. It assumes that people who are motivated to arrive at preferred 
conclusions tend to employ beliefs and strategies especially likely to lead to these conclusions 
(Kunda 1990, 1999; Brownstein 2003). 
Turner (2001) suggests that the effects of accountability pressure vary with the nature of 
the task. Hereby, she distinguishes between belief tasks and action tasks. Action tasks directly 
affect the audit outcome, e.g. the decision what to disclose in the financial statement and what 
type of audit opinion to issue, while belief tasks are judgments that do not affect the audit 
outcome. The distinction between belief and action tasks is somewhat blurred as the formed 
beliefs have often at least some effect on the audit outcome. Therefore, the two types of tasks 
have to be considered as two extremes of a spectrum. Turner’s categorization is based on 
psychology research where a distinction is made between judgments in which beliefs are 
expressed and choices in which actions are selected (Einhorn and Hogarth 1981; Payne 1982).  
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In action tasks, people experience most intimately feelings of responsibility (Tversky 
1972; Turner 2001) which can intensify the felt accountability pressure. Furthermore, action tasks 
often involve a justification process (Slovic et al. 1982) in which the potential costs associated 
with potentially negative outcomes are considered (Brown et al. 1999). These two effects have 
the ultimate result that auditors are highly sensitive to known preferences of the parties that they 
are accountable to and especially likely to follow the acceptability heuristic for those tasks 
(Turner 2001).  
For belief tasks, the situation is different. While the audit outcome is externally 
communicated via the financial statement and the audit opinion, the documentation of beliefs in 
the working papers is not disclosed. It can be expected that clients are less concerned about the 
undisclosed beliefs which relieves the auditor from pressure. In line with this, auditing research 
has demonstrated that auditors often document their skepticism in working papers (e.g. Rich et al. 
1997; Johnstone 2000; Moreno and Bhattacharjee 2003). Theory also suggests that auditors are 
more concerned about quality in belief tasks (Turner 2001). One dimension of audit quality is 
professional skepticism (Gramling 1999) which is required by auditing standards like SAS No. 
99. It shall be exerted especially in circumstances in which the client has strong incentives to 
manipulate financial statements. Consistent with this argument, prior research has shown that 
auditors are more skeptical when evaluating evidence when clients have high incentives to 
misreport (e.g. Beaulieu 2001; Anderson et al. 2004; Kizirian et al. 2005).  
One of the few published studies in which the client of the auditor was manipulated is 
Buchman et al. (1996). In their experiment, auditors were either accountable to no one, to the 
client in form of the management, or to the audit partner. The task of the auditors was to evaluate 
an ambiguous accounting case. They detected a slight tendency that auditors favour the client in 
action tasks. One reason for the limited number of studies that manipulate the client might be that 
the institutional setting in the U.S. does not provide a realistic scenario for this. More often, the 
preference of the audit partner to which the auditor is accountable was manipulated. Findings are 
that reviewees often succumb to the known preferences of the reviewer, e.g. when assessing the 
credibility of client’s explanations of errors (Peecher 1996), when deciding to accept a client 
(Cohen and Trompeter 1998), or when deciding whether to sign off on statements that are 
materially misstated (Lord and DeZoort 2001). 
In our hypotheses, we follow Turner (2001) and distinguish between belief and action 
tasks. For belief tasks, we predict that auditors are especially concerned about quality with the 
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effect that professional scepticism prevails over accountability pressure. For action tasks, we 
predict that the accountability pressure is higher with the result that the effects from the use of the 
acceptability heuristic prevail over the effects of the exertion of professional skepticism. 
 
H1a: Auditors will show professional scepticism in belief tasks when they are accountable 
to a client with preferences for higher earnings 
 
H1b: Auditors will employ the acceptability heuristic in action tasks when they are 
accountable to a client with preferences for higher earnings 
 
Economic Incentives 
Having the objective of gaining the approval or escaping censure from the source of the 
pressure is a precondition for accountability (Tetlock 1985). For auditors, the objective of caring 
about the client’s approval may arise from financial incentives of retaining the client. Auditors 
can earn rents from incumbent clients even in competitive markets (DeAngelo 1981). Auditors 
pay for these rents in the first period by pricing the audit below costs, which is called lowballing. 
Psychological research suggests that these sunk costs might additionally strengthen incentives to 
keep the client (Arkes and Blumer 1985; Dopuch and King 1996). Incentives from quasirents and 
lowballing can arise not only from audit fees, but also from nonaudit fees (Magee and Tseng 
1990; Lee and Gu 1998). In order to improve auditor independence, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has 
limited the opportunities for audit firms to cross-sell nonaudit services to their audit clients (SEC 
2003a). Similar measures were enacted in the European Union (European Union 2006).  
Experiments have found evidence that auditors react to economic incentives. In the 
experiment of Kadous et al. (2003), the goal commitment to keep the client was elicited. Their 
results revealed that auditors who showed a high degree of goal commitment were more likely to 
accept the accounting method favored by the client. In line with this finding, factors that 
endangered auditors’ independence were client’s importance (Lord 1992), a low litigation risk 
(Chang and Hwang 2003), and the perspective to generate additional fees from the client in the 
future (e.g. Farmer et al. 1987; Chang and Hwang 2003).  
Empirical research has not yielded convincing evidence on the potentially negative effects 
of relatively or absolutely high nonaudit fees on proxies for auditor independence.  While Frankel 
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(2002) observed an association between nonaudit fees and the level of discretionary accruals, 
later research provided evidence that this result is not a robust one, but was driven by a small 
subsample of firms (Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Reynolds et al. 2004; Larcker and Richardson 2004). 
Antle (2006) even observed that high non-audit fees decreased the level of discretionary accruals. 
No significant results were also reported for the association between non-audit fees and other 
proxies for auditor independence, for example, the propensity to issue going-concern opinions 
(DeFond et al. 2002), the degree of conservatism (Ruddock et al. 2006), and the earnings-
response coefficient (Higgs and Skantz 2006). 
The mixed empirical findings might be explained by the also existent incentives for 
remaining independent (Watts and Zimmerman 1986). It has been shown that a loss of reputation 
for being independent can have real economic consequences, leading to lower audit fees (Beatty 
1993; Craswell et al. 1995) or even to the loss of clients (Chaney and Philipich 2002; 
Krishnamurthy et al. 2006). Experiments have shown that litigation risk reduces the degree of 
concession to client pressure (Farmer et al. 1987; Chang and Hwang 2003; Blay 2005).  
Auditors face both incentives to seek approval of the client and to remain independent. As 
the attitude shifts occurring in response to the acceptability heuristic depend on the strength of 
any perceived incentives to support the other’s position (Krizan and Windschitl 2007), we put 
forth the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Auditors perceiving the economic incentives for keeping the client to be high will be 
biased towards the preferences of the client. 
 
Psychological Pressure 
A further premise for an attitude shift is that the person who is accountable to someone 
else actually experiences accountability pressure (Tetlock 1985). In auditing, this pressure can 
arise in meetings with the management board. Meetings are an essential part of the audit process 
as the auditor must communicate with the management to obtain the information necessary for 
conducting the audit. The management exercises pressure in these meetings to convince the 
auditor of its preferred accounting method (Johnstone et al. 2002) which is often the one that 
increases earnings (Nelson et al. 2002). The auditor’s role is to enforce any adjustments towards 
the accurate accounting method (Gibbins et al. 2001; Sanchez et al. 2007). The interaction 
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between the auditor and the client can be considered to be a classical scenario of negations (Antle 
and Nalebuff 1991; Trotman et al. 2005). 
The supervisory board can also put pressure on the auditor. In the U.S., the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act emphasized the accountability of the auditor towards its supervisory board by 
expanding and clarifying auditors’ reporting duties towards the audit committee (Section 204). In 
Germany, auditors are obliged to report their findings in a comprehensive audit report to the 
supervisory board (Section 321 German Commercial Code). Furthermore, they are required to 
explain these findings in a mandatory meeting with the supervisory board (Section 176 Para. 2 
German Stock Corporation Act).  
In reality, auditors may experience pressure both from the management board and the 
supervisory board. As research has shown that the pressure felt affects the action taken (Gibbins 
and Newton 1994), we hypothesize that psychological pressure will especially affect the behavior 
of those auditors who perceive that pressure to be high. 
 
H3: Auditors perceiving the psychological pressure to be high will be biased towards the 
preferences of the client 
 
Experience 
Buchman et al. (1996) state that “expectations about the relationship between experience 
and the social contingency model are unclear since the relationship has never been studied” (p. 
384), and their experiment do not shed further light on this issue. Further studies provide mixed 
or inconclusive evidence. For example, Chang and Hwang (2003) suspect that experience 
influences the decision to succumb to client pressure, and use it as a covariate in their analysis, 
but the interaction effect is insignificant.  
Some research suggests that perceived economic incentives and psychological pressure 
are stronger for more experienced auditors and for auditors at higher hierarchical levels. 
Experienced auditors might perceive their economic incentives to be greater, as their performance 
evaluation and compensation often rely strongly on the fee which they generate (Emby and 
Etherington 1996). Consistent with this, Haynes et al. (1998) found that more experienced 
auditors favored the client position more often than inexperienced auditors and Trompeter (1994) 
provides evidence that the compensation scheme can influence auditors’ decisions. Perceived 
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psychological pressure might be stronger for senior managers and partners as they have 
presumably a more vivid image of that pressure, based on their real-life experience, than 
inexperienced auditor. 
Some research suggests the opposite, showing that more experienced auditors possess a 
higher degree of tacit knowledge such as communication or interpersonal skills (Bonner and 
Lewis 1990; Tan and Libby 1997; Abdolmohammadi et al. 2004). Moreno and Bhattacherjee 
(2003) argue that tacit knowledge would help auditors to withstand the economic incentives to 
please the client by being able to consider also counteracting incentives, such as litigation risk or 
reputation loss. Farmer et al. (1987) also find weak evidence that more experienced auditors 
display a lower tendency towards client advocacy. High tacit knowledge might also help auditors 
to develop strategies for coping with psychological pressure. 
In light of the contradicting arguments described above, we formulate the following 
research questions. 
 
RQ1: The effects of perceived economic incentives interact with the experience of the 
auditor 
 
RQ2: The effects of perceived psychological pressure interact with the experience of the 
auditor 
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EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Experimental Procedure 
Two of the Big 4 audit firms in Germany agreed to support the experiment by providing 
participants. Altogether 72 auditors participated in four sessions.6 In each session, one of the 
authors was present, together with one or two research assistants, to ensure a controlled 
processing of the experiment. At the first audit firm, auditors participated in the experiment at the 
end of the first day of two-day training, which was designed for auditors with all levels of 
experience. Experimental sessions were held in three different regions of Germany, with the 
number of participants ranging from 9 to 23 auditors per session. At the second audit firm, the 
experiment was conducted prior to a nationwide partner/manager meeting, and participants were 
asked to sign up for the experiment in beforehand. 20 partner and senior managers participated. 
For both audit firms, the format of the experiment was the same. 
The outline of the experimental procedure is show in figure 1. In each session, the 
subjects were randomly assigned to one of two treatment groups (management board, supervisory 
board) by blindly drawing from a deck of cards. Each treatment group was then seated at a 
different table. At the beginning of the experiment, the general procedures were read aloud to all 
participants without indicating the presence of two treatment groups. The experimental materials 
consisted of three parts. First, auditors received the description of the audit appointment and the 
audit client followed by control questions about this scenario. Second, auditors were given the 
task of evaluating two controversial accounting issues. Each accounting case consisted of a 
description of the accounting method used by the audited company in the preliminary statement 
and five pieces of evidence accompanied by general accounting guidelines. The auditors had the 
task to evaluate both the meaning of each piece of evidence and the overall accordance with 
GAAP (belief tasks). They also had to choose which accounting method would be most 
appropriate and which audit opinion they would issue (action tasks). Third, auditors filled out a 
questionnaire which had both some general questions, and questions relating to their experience 
level, their perceived economic incentives, and their perceived psychological pressure. For the 
last part of the experiment, about one in eight auditors was randomly chosen for the simulated 
meeting with the client. The selected auditors had to defend their audit judgments and decisions 
                                                 
6 72 subjects indicated auditing as their main field, among them 52 male and 15 female auditors; five participants did 
not indicate their gender. In total, 84 subjects participated. We excluded 12 participants who indicated IT-auditing, 
tax consulting or consulting as their main field. Our main results hold, nevertheless, when we include all subjects in 
our analysis. 
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in a face-to-face meeting with one of the conductors of the experiment. The experiment took 
about 30 to 60 minutes; the simulated meeting took about 5 to 10 minutes.  
 
Figure 1 
Experimental Procedure 
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client 
 Evaluation of two 
accounting cases 
(order randomized) 
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Manage-
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Favoring 
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statement 
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Background 
information about the 
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presentation of five 
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‐ Evidence 
evaluation 
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client was 
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of the 
conductors of 
the experiment.
 
 
Dependent Variables 
In our experiment, auditors evaluated two accounting case studies under German GAAP. 
The order in which these were presented was randomly varied across subjects. The first case 
covered the measurement of provisions for warranties and the second case covered the size of 
depreciations of doubtful accounts receivable. These accounting issues are also relevant in 
auditor-client meetings as they affect the reported earnings (Gibbins et al. 2001) and have often 
been used in the auditing research before (e.g. Buchman et al. 1996; Turner 2001). We designed 
the cases to be ambiguous as this is one antecedent for an attitude shift (Chaiken et al. 1989; 
Boiney et al. 1997). Auditing research also suggests that the risk of auditors’ impairment of 
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independence is higher when no clear guidelines exists (Trompeter 1994; Salterio and Koonce 
1997; Kennedy et al. 1997; Johnstone et al. 2002).  
In each case study, the accounting method used by the audited company in its preliminary 
statement was presented at the beginning. Auditors then received stepwise five pieces of evidence 
and rated after each one its its consistency with the account method used by the audited company 
on a 11-point-Likert scale from -5 (fully inconsistent) to +5 (fully consistent). Our first dependent 
variable is the aggregated value of the five evaluations of evidence (aggregated scale from -25 to 
+25). After evaluating the evidence, auditors were asked to judge the conformance of the 
company’s accounting method with GAAP on an 11-point-Likert scale, our second dependent 
variable. They also chose the amount they consider appropriate for the measurement of the 
balance sheet item. The hypothetical earnings effect of this choice is our third dependent variable. 
Finally, auditors decided what audit opinion they would issue if the audited company were to 
make no adjustments in their final statement. For enabling auditors to judge the materiality of the 
misstatement, we provided general background information about the audited company. We 
described the audited firm as a large, private limited liability corporation with sales of 1 800 Mio., 
earnings of 5.0 Mio. €, and a balance sheet total of 1 000 Mio €. Auditors decided between 
issuing an adverse, a qualified, and an unqualified opinion, our fourth dependent variable.  
Following Turner (2001), we distinguish between belief and action tasks. In our context, 
we classify the evaluation of evidence and the evaluation of the conformance with GAAP as 
belief tasks. We do so as they involve evaluations which are primarily conducted for 
documentation in the working papers and are only loosely associated with the externally 
communicated audit outcome. Furthermore, they fulfill the definition of judgment tasks, a 
concept related to belief tasks, as values are assigned in terms of a rating scale (Payne 1982). We 
classify the decision of the measurement of the balance sheet item and of type of audit opinion to 
issue as action tasks. These decisions are both externally communicated in the financial statement. 
They also fulfill the definition of choice tasks, a concept related to action tasks, as they involve 
the selection of an explicit alternative (Payne 1982). We consider the audit opinion as our 
primary dependent variable, since the decision as to which audit opinion to issue is the auditor’s 
primary task. It is also the decision in which justification needs and accountability pressure are 
strongest for the auditor (Buchman et al. 1996; Turner 2001). Furthermore, measures of auditor 
independence are widely based on the degree of truthful external reporting of audit findings (e.g. 
DeAngelo 1981).  
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Table 1 
Dependent variables 
 
Type 
of task 
Dependent 
variable 
Elicitation method Characteristics 
Belief 
task 
Evidence 
evaluation  
“Is the piece of evidence 
consistent with the 
accounting method used 
by the audited company?” 
-5 (fully inconsistent) to +5 (fully consistent) 
for each piece of evidence. 
-25 to +25 summed up over all five pieces of 
evidence.   
GAAP 
conform-
ance 
“Is the accounting method 
used in conformance with 
German-GAAP?” 
Scale from 0 (=not in conformance with 
GAAP) to 10 (=fully in conformance with 
GAAP). 
Action 
task 
Measure-
ment 
“What value should be 
reported in the financial 
statement for the balance 
sheet position in 
question?” 
The earnings reduction when employing the 
accounting method suggested by the auditor 
was calculated. Possible ranges: -15 to 110 
Mio. € for the provision case, -10 to 115 Mio. 
€ for the receivables case, -25 to 225 Mio. € 
summed up over both cases) 
Opinion 
“What audit opinion 
should be issued?” 
 
adverse opinion (=0), qualified opinion (=1), 
unqualified opinion (=2). For calculating the 
total opinion, the average of both decisions 
was calculated. 
 
 
The first case concerned the valuation of a new product’s warranties. The audited 
company measured the provision at 110 Mio. € in the preliminary financial statement. Auditors 
rated the provided evidence to be, on average, in accordance with this accounting method (scale: 
-25 to +25; mean = -0.77; SD=6.66). They judged the accounting method used to be somewhat in 
conformance with German GAAP (scale: 0 to 10; mean = 5.55; SD = 3.01). On average, they 
considered a measurement of 130 Mio € for the provision to be appropriate. Thus, they proposed 
an average downward adjustment in earnings of 20 Mio € (scale: -15 Mio. € to + 110 Mio. €; SD 
= 22.77). 47 auditors issued an unqualified opinion, 19 a qualified opinion and 5 an adverse 
opinion. On the whole, auditors considered the accounting case to be rather ambiguous (scale: 1 
to 7; mean = 5.1; SD = 1.51). 
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Figure 2 
Descriptive statistics: the provision for warranties case 
 
Evidence evaluation 
+25 = Evidence fully 
consistent with the 
accounting method used 
-25 = Evidence fully 
inconsistent with the 
accounting method used 
 
 
 
Mean = -0.78 
SD = 6.66 
n = 72  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GAAP conformance 
10 = Accounting method 
used is in full conformance 
with GAAP 
0 = Accounting method 
used is not in conformance 
with GAAP 
 
 
 
Mean = 5.55 
SD = 3.01 
n = 71
Measurement 
Earnings reduction when 
using the accounting 
method considered to be 
most appropriate by the 
auditor instead of the one 
used in the preliminary 
statement.  
 
 
Mean =20.35 
SD = 22.77 
n = 70
Opinion 
Audit opinion if the 
company does not change 
its accounting method  
 
 
 
 
 
Unqual. op. = 47 
Qualified op. = 19 
Adverse op. = 5 
 
The second case concerned the valuation of a doubtful account receivable. The audited 
company measured the provision at 115 Mio. € in the preliminary financial statement. In their 
evaluation, auditors considered the evidence to be in general opposition to the accounting method 
used (scale: -25 to + 25; mean = -4.75; SD = 9.61), and believed that this method does not agree 
with German GAAP (scale: 0 to 10; mean = 2.96; SD = 2.77). They suggested that the doubtful 
accounts receivable should be depreciated by 59 Mio. € (scale = -10 Mio. € to 115 Mio. €; SD = 
37.05)  to a value of 56 Mio. €. 19 auditors stated that an unqualified opinion can still be justified, 
37 qualified the opinion and 14 issued an adverse opinion. They considered the accounting case 
to be less ambiguous than the provision case (scale: 1 to 7, mean = 4.3; SD = 1.45). 
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Figure 3 
Descriptive statistics: the accounts receivable case 
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Independent Variables 
Client 
We manipulated client type by telling the subjects that either the management board or 
the supervisory board has been responsible for the appointment of the auditor. As described 
above, the distinct German institutional setting allows using such a manipulation in a realistic 
way. Auditors received information about the particular incentives of the client to which they 
were assigned. We ensured that auditors internalized this information by administering control 
questions about the preferences of their client. 
The management board was described as having incentives to bias earnings upward, and 
wishing to maintain the aggressive accounting methods used in the preliminary financial 
statement. We stated that the board’s incentives arose from the danger that the audited company 
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would miss earnings forecasts otherwise, in which case board members would forfeit their bonus 
payments and would be at risk of replacement. 
The supervisory board was described as having incentives to support downward 
adjustments in the preliminary financial statement. This board of the firm in question was 
dominated by bank representatives, as is often the case in Germany. We attributed the board’s 
favoring of a conservative accounting method to its desire to ensure the repayment of debts. 
Furthermore, we emphasized the litigation risks for members of the supervisory board in the 
event of misstatements. 
Thirty-seven subjects were randomly chosen to be accountable towards the management 
board, and 35 auditors were randomly chosen to be responsible towards the supervisory board. 
The manipulation of client preferences proved to be successful. Auditors with the management 
board as their client rated the client as preferring an aggressive accounting method (+4.3 on a 
scale from -5 (conservative) to +5 (aggressive)), while auditors with the supervisory board as a 
client rated the client as preferring a conservative accounting method (-3.0). The difference in 
ratings is highly statistically significant (p < 0.001). 
 
Economic Incentives 
We created a situation in which the auditor had a high economic incentive to retain the 
client. For both client conditions, we explained that the previous auditor had been replaced 
because of disagreement with the client. We also stated that the client contributed to one-fourth 
of the total audit fees for the local office. 
We measured the perceived economic incentives of the auditor indirectly by asking in the 
questionnaire how large the proportion of audits is, in their experience, in which the auditor is 
likely to be replaced in the case of dissent between auditor and client. Our use of perceived 
economic incentive as a dependent variables has also been used in past studies, e.g. Trompeter 
(1994) or Kadous et al. (2003). We used an 11-point-Likert scale ranging from 0% to 100%, with 
10% intervals. Answers ranged from 10% to 80% with a mean of 36% (SD = 23.94). For 
improving the robustness of our analyses, we performed a median split and classified the 10% to 
30% range as perceiving the economic incentives to be low, and the 40% to 80% range as 
perceiving the economic incentives to be high. Such a median split was, for example, also 
performed by Kadous et al. (2003). 
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Psychological Pressure 
We created accountability pressure by requiring the auditors to justify their decisions, 
both in written form and face-to-face with the client (Brazel et al. 2004; DeZoort et al. 2006). We 
announced the possibility of a simulated face-to-face meeting with the client at the beginning of 
the experiment together with a general description of the audited company. The auditors were 
notified that about one in eight would be randomly selected at the end of the experiment to 
participate in such a meeting. The methodology of informing subjects of the chance of a review 
has also been used in earlier research, e.g. Tan (1995) or Tan and Kao (1999). 
We tried to ensure that the auditors would clearly envision the scenario of a face-to-face 
meeting by asking them several questions related to that situation. They were asked how often 
they have participated in meetings in which the client hold preferences similar to those depicted 
in our study, and then had to describe a meeting with such a client. In the case that they had not 
yet participated in such a meeting, we requested that they evaluated how well they can visualize it. 
To preserve the salience of the potential face-to-face meeting during the evaluation of the 
accounting cases, we stated before each audit decision that the client will be informed about of it, 
and that this decision will constitute the main topic of discussion during the client meeting.  
We measured the perceived psychological pressure by asking in the final questionnaire 
whether they would agree with the following statement on a 7-point-Likert scale (1=Do not agree 
at all, 7=Fully agree): Have you had the goal of avoiding conflicts during the prospective meeting 
with the client? A similar measure has also been employed as a dependent variable, for example, 
by Felix (2005). Auditors rated the perceived psychological pressure on average to be 2.8. We 
performed a median split and classified the 43 auditors giving ratings of 1 or 2 as perceiving 
psychological pressure to be low, and classified the 28 auditors giving ratings ranging from 3 to 7 
as perceiving psychological pressure to be high. 
 
Experience 
Our experimental setting required auditors to evaluate two rather ambiguous accounting 
cases, to provide a solution to each case, to submit the appropriate audit opinion, and to visualize 
a meeting with the client. As these tasks are rather complex, we required at least two years of 
audit experience. The average work experience of the participants was 9.5 years, with a minimum 
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of 2 years. The distribution of auditors over the different hierarchical levels was reasonably 
balanced: 21 staff members, 18 managers, 18 senior managers and 12 partners participated. Three 
participants did not indicate their level. For our analysis, we classify the auditors at staff and 
manager levels as inexperienced, and the auditors at senior manager and partner level as 
experienced. 
 
Table 2 
Independent variables 
 
 Elicitation method Characteristics 
Client Random assignment Management Board (37 auditors) vs.  
Supervisory Board (35 auditors) 
Economic 
incentives 
“In your experience, how large is 
the proportion of audits in which the 
auditor is likely to be replaced in 
the case of dissent between auditor 
and client?” 
Scale: 0 to 100%; 
Median split:  
10-30% (low) and 40-80% (high) 
Psychological 
pressure 
“Did you pursue the aim to avoid 
conflict with the client in the 
prospective client meeting?”  
Scale: 1 (not at all) to 7 (fully) 
Median split: 
1-2 (low) and 3-7 (high) 
Experience “What is your hierarchical level?”  
 
Inexp.: staff (21), manager (18) 
Exp.: senior manager (18), partner (12) 
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RESULTS 
Main Effect of Client 
We hypothesized that auditors will show professional skepticism in belief tasks (H1a) and 
employ the acceptability heuristic in action tasks (H1b). 
In accordance with Hypothesis 1a, the manipulation of the client has a statistically 
significant effect on the belief tasks. While auditors appointed by the management board 
evaluated evidence to be contradictory to the accounting methods used in the preliminary 
statement (Mean = -5.56; SD = 6.28), auditors assigned by the supervisory board evaluated that 
evidence to be neutral (Mean = 0.19; SD = 7.85). The difference between the two groups is 
highly significant (p < 0.001). It is also robust over all ten pieces of evidence of the two 
accounting cases, and is significant for six pieces. Auditors appointed by the management board 
also evaluated the accounting methods to be significantly less in conformance with German 
GAAP (Mean = 3.70; SD = 2.25) than auditors that were hired by the supervisory board (Mean = 
4.94; SD = 2.11) (p = 0.019). The results that auditors even demonstrate bias against their client 
for belief tasks suggest that knowledge of the management board’s preference to manage 
earnings upward makes auditors more skeptical in these tasks as predicted by Turner (2001). 
Auditors seem to rely on working papers to voice their skepticism, in order to reduce litigation 
risk, and seem to rely less on the acceptability heuristic when forming their beliefs. 
Hypothesis 1b cannot be confirmed. The manipulation of the client had no significant 
effect on audit tasks for auditors who proposed an action. Auditors required, on average, 
adjustments that lowered earnings by 72.6 Mio. € (SD = 44.8 Mio. €) when accountable to the 
management board, and by 66.0 Mio. € (SD = 46.1 Mio €) when accountable to the supervisory 
board (p=0.546). Both groups also issue roughly the same audit opinions (mean = 1.33 vs. 1.34, 
when 0=adverse opinion, 1=qualified opinion, and 2=unqualified opinion). While we do not 
observe that auditors favor the preferences of their client in action tasks, we find that the bias 
against the preferences of the client observed in belief tasks disappears. This suggests that the 
acceptability heuristic might play a role in choices involving action tasks.  
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Table 3 
Main effect of client on belief and action tasks 
 
Task Type of 
Response
Response 
variable 
Management 
Board 
Supervisory Board p  
(two-tailed 
t-Test) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Provision 
for 
Warranties 
Belief 
Evidence -3.70 (6.20) 2.31 (5.71) 0.001*** 
GAAP 4.89 (3.13) 6.23 (2.76) 0.060* 
Action 
Measurm. 24.03 (23.96) 16.47 (21.09) 0.165 
Opinion 1.56 (0.69) 1.63 (0.55) 0.624 
Accounts 
Receivable 
Belief 
Evidence -7.40 (7.90) -1.94 (10.54) 0.016** 
GAAP 2.43 (2.51) 3.53 (2.96) 0.098* 
Action 
Measurm. 48.61 (36.72) 49.43 (37.92) 0.927 
Opinion 1.08 (0.73) 1.06 (0.65) 0.882 
Overall 
Belief 
Evidence -5.56 (6.28) 0.19 (7.85) 0.001*** 
GAAP 3.70 (2.25) 4.94 (2.11) 0.019** 
Action 
Measurm. 72.64 (44.84) 66.03 (46.12) 0.546 
Opinion 1.33 (0.57) 1.34 (0.49) 0.940 
***/**/*: significant on a 1%/5%/10%-level 
 
Economic Incentives 
In the following regression analyses, we concentrate on our primary dependent variable, 
the choice which audit opinion to issue, both combined over both accounting cases and 
segregated by accounting cases. We consider the audit opinion to be ordinal, because each audit 
opinion has only three levels in our experiment (unqualified, qualified, adverse). Therefore, we 
use an ordinal logistic regression analyses. This analysis is rather robust, given that no 
assumptions about the distribution of the target variable are necessary.7 In our regression analyses, 
negative estimates signify the tendency to accept the accounting method favored by the 
management board, by issuing an unqualified opinion. The results reported below also hold 
qualitatively for our second dependent variable qualified as an action task, the level of suggested 
adjustments in measurement. We do not consider the dependent variables derived from belief 
tasks in the following, because effects of the acceptability heuristic play a less important role in 
these tasks.  
                                                 
7 A logistic regression analysis has for example also been used by (Chang and Hwang 2003). Our main results do not 
change when qualifying the audit opinion as continuous and applying an OLS regression. 
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We hypothesized that auditor who perceives the economic incentives to be high will be at 
risk of impaired independence (H2). Our data confirms this hypothesis. We find a highly 
significant interaction between client and perceived economic incentives (L-R Chi-Square = 
6.631; p = 0.010). This means that auditors who perceived economic incentives to be high were 
more inclined to issue an unqualified opinion when their client was the management board than 
when their client was the supervisory board. The effect is significant for the accounts receivable 
task (L-R ChiSquare = 6.312; p = 0.012), and holds in its tendency for the provision task (L-R 
ChiSquare = 2.429, p = 0.119). 
Our results imply that auditors appointed by a supervisory board/audit committee are less 
prone to issue audit opinions which favor the management out of economic motives.  
 
Figure 4 
Interaction effect of perceived economic incentives and client 
 
Total audit opinion = average audit opinion for both cases [0 = adverse opinion, 1 = qualified 
opinion, 2 = unqualified opinion] 
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Table 4 
Effects of client and perceived economic incentives 
 
Dependent variable: Total audit opinion = average audit opinion for both cases  
[0 = adverse opinion, 1 = qualified opinion, 2 = unqualified opinion] 
 
n=66, intercepts not reported  
 
Term Estimate Std 
Error
L-R 
ChiSquare
p 
(ChiSquare)
  
Client[Management Board] 0,341 0,310 1,269 0,260  
Economic Incentives [High] -0,267 0,491 0,291 0,589  
Client[Management Board]* 
Economic Incentives [High] 
-1,284 0,509 6,631 0,010 *** 
***/**/*: significant on a 1%/5%/10%-level 
 
Psychological Pressure 
We hypothesized an interaction effect between perceived psychological pressure and 
client (H3). Our data does not support this hypothesis. However, we find a highly significant 
main effect from the perceived psychological pressure (L-R ChiSquare = 7.882; p = 0.005). 
Auditors tended to issue qualified opinions more often when they had the aim of avoiding 
conflict. This happened regardless of their type of client. The effect remains significant when 
considering the provision task (L-R Chi Square = 4.663; p = 0.031) and the accounts receivable 
task (L-R ChiSquare = 6.210; p = 0.012) separately. 
Our results can be explained by assuming that auditors still experience pressure from the 
management, even when employed by a supervisory board. Therefore, audit committees might 
currently be only limitedly useful in insulating the auditor from management pressure. 
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Table 5  
Effects of client and perceived psychological pressure 
 
Dependent variable: Total audit opinion = average audit opinion for both cases  
[0 = adverse opinion, 1 = qualified opinion, 2 = unqualified opinion] 
 
n=68, Intercepts not reported 
 
Term Estimate Std Error L-R 
ChiSquare
p 
(ChiSquare) 
 
Client[Management board] -0,103 0,285 0,126 0,723  
Psych. Pressure [High] -1,313 0,484 7,882 0,005 *** 
Client[Management board]* 
Psych. Pressure [High] 
0,357 0,463 0,616 0,432  
***/**/*: significant on a 1%/5%/10%-level  
 
Experience 
We formulated the research questions whether the perceived economic and psychological 
factors interact with the experience level (RQ1 and RQ2). 
Our findings suggest that the effects of perceived economic incentives do not differ across 
experience levels. When distinguishing between experienced and inexperienced auditors, we find 
that the interaction effect between client and perceived economic incentives does not strongly 
change with the experience levels. It is significant for experienced auditors (L-R 
ChiSquare=4.932; p=0.026) and marginally significant for inexperienced auditors (L-R 
ChiSquare=2.71; p=0.100). Accordingly, a three-way-interaction between client, perceived 
economic incentives, and experience level is insignificant. Inexperienced and experienced 
auditors also do not differ in their perception of economic incentives (p > 0.45). While 
inexperienced auditors estimated the risk of client loss in the case of dissensions at 38.4 %, 
experienced auditors rated it at 34.0 %. 
In contrast, we find a significant interaction between experience level and perceived 
psychological pressure (L-R ChiSquare=3.936; p=0.047). The effects of perceived psychological 
pressure are significantly weaker for experienced auditors than for inexperienced auditors. 
Analyzing these two groups separately supports this finding. While the main effect of 
psychological incentives is highly significant when considering only inexperienced auditors (L-R 
ChiSquare=7.941; p=0.005), it is insignificant for experienced auditors (p>0.5).  
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Furthermore, we find a marginally significant main effect of experience on the total audit 
opinion (p=0.072)8. More experienced auditors issued unqualified opinions more often than 
inexperienced auditors (1.45 vs. 1.23). This finding is in line with prevailing literature (e.g. 
Abdolmahamadi and Wright (1987)). 
Our findings imply that while experience might be helpful in coping with pressure, it does 
not reduce the risk that economic incentives pose on independence.  
 
Figure 5 
Interaction effect of perceived psychological pressure and experience on the total opinion 
 
Total audit opinion = average audit opinion for both cases  
[0 = adverse opinion, 1 = qualified opinion, 2 = unqualified opinion] 
 
n=67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 In this test, we classify the total opinion to be continuous, and perform a t-test. We deviate from our general 
assumption that the total opinion is ordinal as a chi-square test might be corrupted since there are too many cells with 
n<5. The p-value of the chi-square test is p=0.0711. 
Senior 
Manager/Partner 
Staff/Manager 
-0,5
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
To
ta
l O
pi
ni
on
[o
nt
in
uo
us
]
InexperiencedExperienced
Lo
w
 p
sy
ch
.
pr
es
su
re
H
ig
h 
ps
yc
h.
pr
es
su
re
Senior 
Manager/Partner 
Staff/Manager 
 28
Table 6  
Effects of perceived psychological pressure and experience 
 
Dependent variable: Total audit opinion = average audit opinion for both cases  
[0 = adverse opinion, 1 = qualified opinion, 2 = unqualified opinion] 
 
n=67, intercept not reported 
 
Term Estimate Std Error L-R 
ChiSquare
p 
(ChiSquare)
 
Client[Management board] 0,053 0,228 0,054 0,816  
Psych. Pressure[High] -2,218 0,660 11,213 0,001 *** 
Manager/Partner[yes] -1,505 0,608 6,373 0,012 ** 
Manager/Partner[yes]* 
Psych. Pressure [High] 
1,874 0,968 3,936 0,047 ** 
***/**/*: significant on a 1%/5%/10%-level  
 
Overall model 
To test for the robustness of our results, we set up a model which includes all main 
variables (perceived economic incentives, perceived psychological pressure, experience) as main 
effects and in interaction with the client variable. We also include the interaction of experience 
and psychological pressure as it turned out to be a significant effect in our analyses above. We 
test our model using as the dependent variable the total audit opinion, as well as the audit 
opinions of each accounting case. 
The overall models confirm our results. The interaction effect of perceived economic 
incentives and client is highly significant for the total opinion (p=0.001). It is also highly 
significant for the opinion in the receivable task (p=0.003), and significant for the opinion in the 
provision task (p=0.015).  
We also find the main effect of perceived psychological pressure to be highly significant 
for both accounting cases, both separately (p=0.004 and p=0.001), and combined (p=0.001). As 
in our previous analysis, the interaction effect is not significant for all these conditions.  
Furthermore, we find evidence for the tendency that more experienced auditors issue 
more often unqualified opinions. This effect is highly significant when combining both 
accounting cases (p=0.001). No significant interaction effect of client and experience appears. 
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The interaction effect between experience and psychological pressure is highly significant for the 
total opinion (0.001), and significant for the accounts receivable case (p=0.023). 
 
Table 7 
Overall model 
 
Dependent variable: Total audit opinion = average audit opinion for both cases  
[0 = adverse opinion, 1 = qualified opinion, 2 = unqualified opinion] 
n=65 
 
Term Estimate Std Error L-R 
ChiSquare
p 
(ChiSquare) 
 
Intercept[0] -2,692 0,806   
Intercept[0,5] -1,349 0,564   
Intercept[1] 1,239 0,542   
Intercept[1,5] 3,378 0,658   
Client[Management board] 0,807 0,466 2,800 0,094 * 
Economic Incentives [High] -0,667 0,540 1,572 0,210  
Economic Incentives [High]* 
Client[Management board] 
-2,029 0,598 13,297 0,001 *** 
Psych. Pressure [High]  -3,374 0,794 19,898 0,001 *** 
Psych. Pressure [High]* 
Client[Management board] 
0,272 0,505 0,299 0,584  
Manager/Partner[yes] -2,211 0,685 11,010 0,001 *** 
Manager/Partner[yes]* 
Client[Management board] 
-0,365 0,492 0,562 0,453  
Manager/Partner[yes]* 
Psych. Pressure [High] 
3,403 1,117 10,125 0,001 *** 
***/**/*: significant on a 1%/5%/10%-level 
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CONCLUSIONS 
We tested experimentally for the effects of transferring the authority for the appointment 
of the auditor to an independent board. Such a shift was enacted by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(2002) in the U.S., and by the Corporation Control and Transparency Act (1998) in Germany. In 
our experiment, we make use of the German institutional setting since it provides a more clear-
cut setting as the management and the independent board of the audited company are distinctly 
institutionally separated in the German two-tier board system. The German setting also allows us 
to manipulate the client of the auditor in a realistic context as either the management board or the 
supervisory board can be responsible for the appointment of the statutory auditor for a large 
group of companies. 
First, we do not find support for the claim of "the impossibility of auditor independence". 
Auditors accountable to a management board that prefers an aggressive accounting method do 
not differ in their final audit opinion from auditors accountable to a supervisory board which 
prefers a conservative accounting method. Our findings suggest that accountability effects are 
counteracted by the professional skepticism of the belief tasks. Moore et al. (2006, p. 18) suggest, 
as a solution to independence problems caused by accountability, that regulators should "create 
countervailing interests that compel practitioners to become painfully self-conscious and 
preemptively self-critical about their auditing practices". According to our findings, the 
requirement of professional skepticism already constitutes such a proposed solution. 
Second, making the auditor accountable towards the supervisory board might help to 
overcome the danger of impaired independence stemming from economic incentives, but not that 
stemming from pressure. While auditors, who perceive economic incentives to be high, become 
more skeptical when accountable to the supervisory board, auditors perceiving psychological 
pressure to be high tend to support an aggressive accounting method regardless of client. We 
believe that a plausible explanation for this result is that auditors still perceive pressure from the 
management board, even though the supervisory board is nowadays their client. This would be 
consistent with remarks of some of the participants of the experiments and findings in the 
literature (e.g. Gibbins et al. 2001) that the executive management is the main source of pressure 
for the auditor, while the supervisory board plays a more neutral role primarily focused on 
accuracy (Gendron et al. 2004). 
Third, it seems that more experienced auditors are better able to cope with pressure. This 
finding seems plausible, as research has demonstrated that more experienced auditors show 
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higher tacit knowledge in areas like communication and interpersonal skills. Our findings, 
however, do not support the notion that more experienced auditors are more resistant to economic 
incentives. This might be explained by earlier findings revealing that more experienced auditors 
have greater economic incentives to retain clients, as their compensation is often linked to the 
fees they generate. 
Our findings imply that claims for the impossibility of auditor independence are 
exaggerated, and that various institutional features are helpful in debiasing the auditor. First, the 
requirement of professional skepticism generally counteracts potentially negative effect of the 
acceptability heuristic. Second, experience helps the auditor to cope with psychological pressure. 
Third, making the supervisory board the client of the auditors reduces the risk of an impairment 
of auditors’ independence caused by financial considerations.  
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Appendix: Case studies: Provisions for warranties 
The management board has made a provision of 110 Mio. Euro for warranties for the new 
product Z in the preliminary financial statement. There are no further explanations about the 
provision in the notes.  
1. The manager responsible for external accounting estimates that the costs for warranties for 
the products sold so far will be somewhere between 80 Mio. and 140 Mio. Euro. He thinks 
that every value in that range has about the same probability. Therefore, the expected mean 
value of the costs for warranty is 110 Mio. Euro. 
2. The product Z is a high value product. In the last year, six units of the product were sold. 
3. The product Z was formerly produced in a different version. The historical costs for this 
product called Y were between 150 Mio. and 210 Mio. Euro. The costs were about uniformly 
distributed within this range.  
4. The manager responsible for product development believes that the warranty costs for the 
new product Z will be significantly below the costs of the former product Y. He believes so 
as a major concern by redeveloping the product was the failure rate.  
5. Evaluations of third parties about the improvements in quality of the product Z are not 
available.  
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Appendix: Case studies: Accounts receivable 
The company B has a claim against the company S of a size of 120 Mio. Euro. The company S 
sells as a wholesaler the products of the company B. The management board of the company B 
measures the accounts receivable of this transaction at a value of 115 Mio. Euro in the 
preliminary financial statement.  
 
1. The claim derives from the sale of good that happened 9 months ago. The claim has been due 
for 8 months. Three dunning letters were sent out without any reaction of the company S. 
2. The company B has not received any payments from the company S over the last three 
months with the exception of a smaller payment of 2 Mio. Euro last week.  
3. The sales manager of the company believes that the situation of the company S has improved 
over the last couple of weeks after having declined in the months before. The sales manager 
believes so as the volume of orders of the company S has been increasing again over the last 
month after it had gone down by over 50%.  
4. A well-known rating agency issued a B rating with a negative outlook for the company S. A 
rating of B suggests a medium probability of being not repaid, while the lower rating of C 
suggests a high probability of being not repaid. The rating of the company S was issued one 
year ago when the company S took up a major loan.  
5. There are rumors that the solvent company H is interested in taking over the company S. The 
rumor was demented by the company S.  
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